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CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
THE QUEST FOR A COHERENT POSITION
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE
The Ohio State University
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....

This clause of the First Amendment, recently
applied by the Supreme Court to invalidate
certain religious practices in the public schools,'
has called down a new storm over the Supreme
Court. The storm has not consisted merely of
the political bombast of predictable critics.2
Rather, it has included Dean Griswold of the
Harvard Law School who perceived in the first
school prayer case an unyielding and unwarranted absolutism in the position of the Court.3
It includes also highly regarded church figures,
such as Episcopal Bishop Pike, who has called
for a constitutional amendment to alter the
Court's mandates.4 It has percolated within the
law schools,5 and within the Court itself where
1 School District v. Schempp, and Murray v.
Curlett, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2 "They
put the Negroes in the schools-now
they put God out of the schools." Statement by
G. W. Andrews, Representative from Alabama,
New York Times, June 26, 1962, p. 1, col. 8. See
also the remarks of Senators Eastland, Johnston,
McClellan, Talmadge, Robertson, Stennis, and
Beall, ibid., June 30, 1962, p. 20, cols. 2, 5, and
sources cited in Kauper, "Prayer, Public Schools
and the Supreme Court," University of Michigan
Law Review, Vol. 61 (1963) p. 1031, n. 2; see also
H.J.R. No. 21, a Joint Resolution adopted by the
105th General Assembly of Ohio (1963), memorializing the Ohio public school system "that
daily prayer and Bible reading should be practiced in the schools of Ohio."
3 Griswold, "Absolute is in the Dark," Utah
Law Review, Vol. 8 (1963), p. 167.
4 New
York Times, July 14, 1962, p. 9, col. 2;
Reader's Digest, 78-85 (1962). For an excellent
news treatment of the Engel case, see CBS
Reports, Storm Over the Supreme Court, Part Two,
originally telecast on March 13, 1963. Reprints
are available from the CBS Television Network.
6 See, e.g., Kauper, op. cit. supra; Choper, "Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard," University of Minnesota Law
Review, Vol. 47 (1963), p. 329; Sutherland, "Establishment According to Engel," Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 76 (1962), p. 25; Pfeffer, "Court,
Constitution and Prayer," Rutgers Law Review,

lengthy separate opinions were composed to
clarify what has and what has not been done.6
Yet, even within the Court, as within the larger
academic and public forums, wide disagreement remains as to the applied meaning of the
opaque language of the religion clause.7
This article cannot quiet the storm over the
Supreme Court, but it can make clear which
parts of the storm are entitled to be taken seriously and which are merely bluster. Beyond
this, there are more significant purposes to be
served. The first of these is to make sense of
existing cases in terms of some coherent doctrine, responsive to the First Amendment and
possessing substantial predictive value: to describe the standard of church-state separation
which the Supreme Court applies in fact. The
second is to demonstrate that a number of open
questions remain to be answered before a more
precise boundary of church-state separation
can be known. The third purpose of this article
is to propose and to defend certain answers to
Vol. 16 (1962), p. 735; Kurland, "The Regents'
Prayer Case: Full of Sound and Fury Signifying . . . ," 1962 The Supreme Court Review, p. 1.
6 In Engel v. Vitale, above, note 1, three opinions covering thirty pages appeared, with two
members of the Court not participating in the
decision. In School District v. Schempp, also
above, note 1, four separate opinions spanning
117 pages of United States Reports were involved. The multiple opinions in the Sunday
Closing Law cases span 220 pages and reveal
breaches within the Court felt again this year in
the four separate opinions filed in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 298, 83 S.Ct. 1790 (1963).
is by no means confined to
7 The disagreement
a split between the majority of eight and Mr.
Mr. Justice
Justice Stewart who dissented.
Douglas apparently would apply the Establishment Clause whenever there is one cent of public
funds involved. Mr. Justice Brennan would obviously uphold a vast number of practices unacceptable to Mr. Justice Douglas, and there are significant differences as well in the concepts of neutrality in the opinions of Mr. Justice Clark, in
relation to those by Justices Goldberg and
Harlan.
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the open questions, to provide the Court with a
position which is both coherent and neutral.
I
A restatement of the Religion Clause to conform to the Court's response to the First
Amendment is not without its difficulties; the
Court has never used that clause to invalidate a
single federal statute, notwithstanding the
many substantial connections which continue
to be maintained between organized religion
and the federal government. Certain surface
inconsistencies, moreover, appear among the
several cases upholding certain federal laws
which confer conspicuous benefits on some
religious groups.8 All of the decisions invalidating laws because they either abridged the free
exercise of religion, or tended to establish
religion, have involved state laws only.9 And
each of these decisions has relied upon an
Amendment to the Constitution which itself
makes no express mention of "religion" whatever and provides only the following vague
statement:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of
law ....
8 See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944); Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366
(1918); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908);
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S.
457 (1891); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 219
(1899); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
9 See e.g., the Schempp, Murray and Engel cases
cited above, note I; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961); McCollum v. School Board, 333
U.S. 203 (1948), holding state laws invalid as an
of religion. Sherbert v. Verner,
establishment
above, note 6; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413
(1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943);
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Mur319 U.S. 105 (1943);
dock v. Pennsylvania,
Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Jones
v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), holding state laws
invalid as abridging the free exercise of religion.
There has been a host of cases in which freedom of
religion was involved, but where the decision was
not in fact based on an "abridgment" theory.
See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938); Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); Cochran v. La. State Bd. of
Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). For a superior discussion of these and related cases, see Kurland,
Religion and the Law (Chicago, 1962).
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In the process of interpreting this Amendment to make applicable against state government the full religion clause of the First
Amendment, itself applicable only against
Congress,"0 the Court has rejected a number of
arguments still troublesome to the historically
minded. Successively, the Court considered and
disposed of the following contentions: (1) the
due process clause, as part of the Fourteenth
Amendment, was ratified in 1868 merely to
extend additional constitutional protection to
Negroes beyond what the Reconstruction Congress believed had already been accomplished
in the Thirteenth Amendment, and had no
purpose to limit government power outside the
race zone; (2) the clause, as it says, is concerned
only with the integrity of the process or means
by which decisions affecting life, liberty, or
property are made, i.e., that those means conform with due process, and it has nothing to do
with the substance of a legislative decision
arrived at by an appropriate and reasonable
procedure; (3) assuming there is a substantive
due process aspect to the clause, however, an
interest in religion is not within the kind of
"liberty" contemplated; i.e., there was no incorporation of the First Amendment's religion
clause into the due process clause; (4) assuming
there was some incorporation, still, since the
due process clause speaks of "liberty," only
that part of the First Amendment protecting
religious liberty is made applicable to states,
and the establishment clause is not applicable.
Consequently, if a state law does not impair
anyone's liberty to worship as he pleases; there
can be no complaint if it merely promotes
religion or subsidizes religious interests, even
though such practices might constitute an
establishment of religion under the First
Amendment."
10 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L.Ed. 672
44 U.S.
(1833); Permoli v. First Municipality,
(3 How.) 589 (1845).
11 Historical analyses of the religion clause in
and of its application
the First Amendment,
include
Amendment,
through the Fourteenth
Healey, Jefferson on Religion in Public Education (1962); Murray, We Hold These Truths (New
York; Shead and Ward, 1960); Howe, "The Constitutional Question," Religion and the Free Society, Vol. 49 (1958); Brady, Confusion Twice
Confounded (1954); Pfeffer, Church, State and
Freedom (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1962) pp.
124-33; O'Neill, Religion and Education Under
the Constitution (New York, 1949); Corwin, The
Supreme Court as a National School Board, A Constitution of Powers in a Secular State (1951);
Stokes, Church and State in the United States, I,
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It is familiar learning that all of these arguments have been rejected, and that the First
Amendment is regarded as fully and equally
applicable against the states. Similarly, the
Court has rejected the argument that the
establishment clause was intended only to
require that government be neutral among
religions, rather than detached from religion
itself, i.e., that laws of benefit to religion are
constitutional when the benefit is extended on
a nonsectarian or nonpreferential basis sufficient to guard against establishing any one
church as the state religion. The rejection of this
and the preceding arguments has now become
so consistent and so emphatic that there is no
practical benefit in re-evaluating them once
again. Since 1947, the Court has heard eleven
cases involving challenges to state laws where
the challenges were based on the establishment
clause of the First Amendment.12 In nearly
every case, the arguments summarized above
were elaborately presented in behalf of the
state. While only five of the eleven cases actually went against the state in terms of the
decision, in no case did the Court sustain a law
537-61 (1950); Parsons, The First Freedom (1948);
Bryce, The American Commonwealth (New York,
1914), II, 763-95; Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States (Boston, 1865),
III, ? 1865 et seq.; Murray, "Law or Prepossessions?," Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol.
14 (1959), p. 23; Katz, "Freedom of Religion and
State Neutrality,"
University of Chicago Law
Review, Vol. 20 (1953), p. 426; Pfeffer, "Church
and State: Something Less than Separation,"
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 19 (1951)
p. 1; Lardner, "How Far Does the Constitution Separate Church and State?," this REvIEw,
Vol. 45 (1951), p. 110; Konvitz, "Separation of
Church and State: The First Freedom," Law and
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 14 (1949), p. 44;
U.C.L.A. Law Review, Vol. 9 (1962), pp. 495,
499.
12 In addition to the five cases cited in note 9
above, invalidating state laws establishing religion, the Court has sustained laws against such
a challenge in the following six cases: McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), (four cases consolidated); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1 (1947). In addition, two members of the Court
invoked the establishment
clause this year in
Sherbert v. Verner, above, note 6, and there are
other cases where the issue was not raised or not
heard, e.g., Cochran v. La. State Bd. of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Doremus v. Board of
Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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on the basis of any of the above arguments.
That these arguments are no longer presentable
in the Court is clear from the following abrupt
statements from the majority opinion in this
year's school prayer cases:
First, this Court has decisively settled that the
First Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" has
been made wholly applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, this Court has rejected unequivocally the
contention that the establishment clause forbids
only governmental preference of one religion over
another.13

What the Court has done, instead, is to treat
the two aspects of the religion clause as stating
a single principle applicable to federal and
state government. One aspect is the admonition
that government may not act to burden the
free exercise of religion. The other is that
government may not act to benefit religion.
The free exercise and establishment subclauses,
taken together, are thus designed to commit
government to a studied neutrality with respect to religion while government attempts to
fulfill its numerous delegated, implied, and
reserved secular responsibilities.
Distilled
13 School
District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
215-16 (1963).
14 Id. at 226: "We
have come to recognize
through bitter experience that it is not within
the power of government to invade that citadel,
whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose,
to advance or retard. In the relationship between
man and religion, the State is firmly committed
to a position of neutrality."
See also Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1, 52 (1947) (dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice Rutledge): "The sphere of religious activity, as distinguished from the secular intellectual liberties, has been given the two-fold
protection and, as the state cannot forbid, neither
can it perform or aid in performing the religious
function. The dual prohibition makes that function altogether private."
Professor Kurland has attempted to synthesize
the duality of the First Amendment in the following terms (Religion and the Law [1962] pp.
18, 112): "The freedom and separation clauses
should be read as stating a single precept: the
government cannot utilize religion as a standard
for action or inaction because these clauses, read
together as they should be, prohibit classification
in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to
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from the opinions of the Supreme Court, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments may be
read as providing: in the fulfillment of its proper
functions, government should choosefrom among
feasible alternatives, if any, those means which
result in the least advantages and disadvantages
to religion.'5
The political objectives of the religion clause
consequently include the following:
1. to insulate governmental processes from
distinctly religious controversy, by restricting
the power of government in a manner which
leaves religious and anti-religious organizations
without special incentive or temptation to
exert institutional pressures on those processes.16

2. to protect the private exercise of religious
commitments from destruction, manipulation
or seizure by the irreligious, by disabling
government from acting with deliberate hostility to religion;
3. to avoid internecine strife among religions
by disabling government from assisting or
impose a burden." There are difficulties in the
application of this particular statement,
however, and for that reason I have employed a
slightly different statement in the text, infra. See
Kauper, "Religion and the Law: A Review,"
Texas Law Review, Vol. 41 (1963), p. 467; Pfeffer,
"Religion-Blind Government: A Review," Stanord Law Review, Vol. 15 (1963), p. 389.
16 See School District v. Schempp, above, note
1, at p. 222: "The test may be stated as follows:
what are the purpose and the primary effect of
the enactment? If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by
the Constitution."
16 The concern to limit government
from having powers which would provide a temptation for
organized religions is evident from the dicta of
the Court: "[T]he effect of the religious freedom
amendment to our Constitution was to take every
form of propagation of religion out of the realm
of things which could directly or indirectly be
made public business....
It was intended not
only to keep the states' hands out of religion,
but to keep religion's hands off the state, and,
above all, to keep bitter religious controversy
from getting control of public policy or the public
purse." Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1, 26, (1947) (dissenting opinion). See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961):
"(T)he writings of Madison, who was the First
Amendment's architect, demonstrate that the establishment of a religion was equally feared because of its tendencies to political tyranny and
subversion of civil authority."
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harming any one or more religions more than
others;
4. to respect the integrity of non-believers by
disabling government from lending its authority in behalf of religion.'7
17 In view
of the trappings of religiosity in
public life, it is commonly supposed that the First
Amendment
is unconcerned
with protecting
atheists and agnostics. Such a view is comforted,
no doubt, by certain congressional acts within the
past decade. In 1954, "under God" was inserted
into the pledge of allegiance. 36 U.S.C. ? 172
(1958). In 1956, "In God We Trust" was adopted
as the national motto by joint resolution. 70
Stat. 732. In 1955, "In God We Trust," first
authorized for imprinting on coins in 1865 (13
Stat. 517, 518), was prescribed for all currency
and coins. 69 Stat. 290. In 1952, Congress memorialized the President to proclaim a National
Day of Prayer each year. 36 U.S.C. ? 185.
The lingering view that the First Amendment is
merely neutral among religions also finds support
in an unguarded dictum by Mr. Justice Douglas,
the consequences of which were ably traced by
Sorauf, "Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a
Supreme Court Decision," this REVIEW, Vol. 53
(1959), p. 777. The dictum, from Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1952), was this:
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. . . When the state
encourages religious instruction
or cooperates
with religious authorities adjusting the schedule
of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the
best of our traditions."
Compare with these, the following statements
by the Court: Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
495 (1961): "We repeat and again reaffirm that
neither a State nor the Federal Government can
constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which
aid all religions as against non-believers,
and
neither can aid those religions based on a belief
in the existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs." Also, Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319, 325 (1952), (dissenting opinions by Mr. Justice Black and Mr.
Justice Jackson, respectively):
"The spiritual
mind of man has thus been free to believe, disbelieve, or doubt, without repression, great or
small, by the heavy hand of government....
The day that this country ceases to be free for
irreligion it will cease to be free for religion-except for the sect that can win political power."
And Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1947): "Neither [a state nor the federal
government] can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
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The operation of this standard in the eleven
cases decided by the Court under the establishment clause may help to indicate its dimensions. In Everson v. Board of Education,'8 the
Court reviewed an ordinance of a New Jersey
township which provided for the reimbursement of the parents of public and parochial
school children for the cost of bus transportation to and from school. The average reimbursement was $40 per family each year. These payments, made from public funds, were attacked
on the grounds that they constituted a tax
subsidy which relieved Catholic parents of
costs they would otherwise have to meet from
private sources and which allegedly constituted
impermissible aid tending to establish religion.
Writing for a majority of five, Mr. Justice
Black conceded that the arrangement did involve a measure of "aid" to religion, but he
declared the ordinance to be valid on the
grounds that such aid was unavoidable and
entirely incidental to the primary and independent secular purposes of the ordinance, e.g., to
promote safety in transportation, and the
education and welfare of children. Since parochial school children were no less likely to encounter traffic hazards than public school
other. Neither can force nor influence a person to
go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance."
While no one may have "standing" to secure
judicial review of Congress's religious obeisances,
it is extremely difficult to reconcile the religious
slogans enacted by Congress into law, with the
following declaration by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465 (1961):
"The Establishment
Clause withdrew from the
sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive,
area of
human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the
verity of some transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief.
Congress may not make these matters, as such,
the subject of legislation, nor, now, may any
legislature in this country. Neither the National
Government nor, under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may, by
any device, support belief or the expression of belief for its own sake, whether from conviction of
the truth of that belief, or from conviction that
by the propagation of that belief the civil welfare
of the State is served, or because a majority of its
citizens, holding that belief, are offended when all
do not hold it.
18

Loc. cit. supra, note 12.
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children, and since the parochial schools' curricula satisfied New Jersey's secular state
standards of education, it was reasonable for a
township to be as concerned with their general
welfare as with the welfare of other school
children, and to treat them equally. The analogy was drawn to other municipal services:
city policemen and firemen protect churches
and their parishoners just as they protect department stores and their customers. Since
these are protected not because they are religious, but solely because, their religion aside,
they are otherwise simply members of a larger
class whose welfare and protection is the proper
concern of government, no violation of the
establishment clause is involved. In terms of
the standard offered above, the decision appears defensible in these terms: It is a proper
function of government to encourage education
and to promote safety in the transportation of
children. Recognizing that government cannot
operate in a vacuum, i.e., with literally no
effect on matters which incidentally assist or
injure religious interests, those secular purposes may be fulfilled by public reimbursement
of the costs of school transportation without
violating the establishment clause.
In McCollum v. Board of Education,9 a
school board permitted various churches to
conduct religious classes on school property
and during the regular school day. Children not
choosing to attend such a class were obliged to
remain on campus, in a study hall. Noting that
the arrangement benefited religion by providing free facilities for religious indoctrination,
and noting too that the program involved a
measure of coercion on impressionable youngsters, the Court was obliged to determine
whether these benefits, like those in Everson,
were merely incidental to some secular purpose,
or at least were no more than an unavoidable
consequence of the fulfillment of some purpose
otherwise within the power of government to
promote. The released-time courses were not,
however, courses about religion which might be
defended simply as constituting part of a
general liberal education.20 Since there was no
primary and independent secular purpose being
fulfilled through the released time program, the
19

333 U.S. 203 (1948).
See School District v. Schempp, above, note
1, at p. 225: "It certainly may be said that the
Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion,
when presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education, may not be effected consistent with the First Amendment.
20
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arrangement was invalidated as an unconstitutional establishment of religion.21
The four Sunday Closing Law Cases22 sus21 Analytically,
the three school prayer cases
are scarcely more difficult on the merits than
McCollum. These cases severally involved
a
prayer composed by state officials and required to
be recited by school children other than those
excused on written request of their parents, and
the recitation of the Lord's Prayer or the reading
of sections from the Bible or Jewish scriptures,
without comment, at the beginning of each school
day. Here, too, participation was required by
students not excused on written request of their
parents, and the religious exercise was itself required by state law or school board regulation.
While markedly less financial aid was involved in
these programs than in McCollum, since the time
taken each day for prayers or bible reading consumed a bare moment or two, the arrangement
still involved substantial aid to religion. Students
doubtless felt some compulsion to participate,
and the prestige of school authorities employed
in a repetitious ritual and the authoritarian
atmosphere of the schoolroom would influence
many youngsters. The inculcation of religion as
distinguished from teaching about religion in
courses on literature or history, moreover, is
clearly not among the "proper functions" of
government. See discussion, notes 17-20, supra.
Consequently, it is easy to appreciate the decision of the Court holding these practices invalid
under the test described above, even assuming
the amount of aid to religion was relatively slight;
such aid was not incidental to any primary or independent secular purpose which would save the
scheme. (The school board alleged, however, that
the religious practices did serve independent
secular purposes. This matter is considered
infra, text, at n. 39. See also Choper, "Religion
in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional
Standard," Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 47 (1963)
p. 329.)
For similar reasons, the religious oath of office,
considered in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 498
(1961), was invalidated under the establishment
clause. Maryland law required, as a condition of
office, that notaries public subscribe to an oath
affirming a belief in a Supreme Being. The coercion of such a religious expression, unsupported
by any primary and independent secular purpose,
resulted in a unanimous decision against its
constitutionality.
22 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961):
Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown
Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
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tained state laws prohibiting commercial
activity on Sunday, even where the law made
no exception for Sabbatarians while exempting
an odd collection of sales transactions relating
to presumed emergency needs, recreation or
works of charity. As in Everson, the Court did
not deny that these laws conferred a benefit on
religion by placing the power of government
behind the strictly religious teaching of some
Christian sects opposed to labor on the Lord's
Day. Moreover, it conceded as well that in
some cases at least, the impetus for such laws
had been frankly religious in character, i.e.,
religious organizations had lobbied successfully
for such statutes. Seemingly, such laws should
be unconstitutional, as they violate the test and
offend the political objective of the establishment clause to keep government from becoming the captive of organized religion.
Nevertheless, the statutes were upheld in all
four cases. As in Everson, the result turned on a
finding that the supposed benefit to religion
which flowed from these laws was merely
incidental to a primary and independent secular objective, properly within the police power
of the state. These objectives were essentially
like those furthered by a variety of laws protecting the health and general welfare of working people, e.g., minimum age and wage laws,
maximum hours laws, collective bargaining
laws, etc. It was equally consistent with the
general welfare to set aside one day in seven, to
assure each person an opportunity for psychological and physical recuperation, to allow
families and friends to come together, and
generally to insulate the community from the
hectic drudgery and raucous noise of the work
week. The fact that the particular day set
aside by law, Sunday, coincided with the
religious preference of dominant organizations,
was not enough to convert the law into an establishment of religion:
[I]t is equally true that the Establishment Clause
does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct
whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide
or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. In many instances, the Congress or state
legislatures conclude that the general welfare of
society, wholly apart from any religious considerations, demands such regulation.23
The eleventh case, Zorach v. Clauson,24 decided in 1952, is a variant of the released-time
program condemned in the McCollum case.
The arrangement in Zorach differed principally
in that: (1) no financial aid was involved be23
24

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 442.
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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cause the religious classes were held off campus
and no school personnel were involved; (2) less
governmental sanction was placed behind the
religious views presented in the off-campus
classes, since the classes were not conducted
under school auspices and the participating
children would not regard the religious instructor with the same submissiveness as they might
their teacher within the regular classroom.
Still, some evidence indicated that because
non-participating students were required to
remain in their classrooms, government did aid
religion by subtly coercing student participation. But even more critical, the Zorach
arrangement showed no more of a substantial,
or primary and independent secular purpose
being served by the released-time program than
in McCollum itself. Consequently, this case is
often regarded as a departure from the standard, and as an aberration not likely to be followed today.25

25 It is arguable,
however, that Zorach is defensible according to the standard, when one recalls that the unitary precept of the First Amendment is that government should act neither to
benefit nor to burden religion. If one focusses
not exclusively on the released-time program,
but on the net effect of government having embarked on a compulsory education program,
Zorach becomes more understandable
in these
terms: by enacting laws to require children to attend schools during most of the day, the state
initially made it more difficult than before for
those students to attend religious classes during
those same days. By thereafter scheduling its own
secular classes to accommodate those students
who wished to attend religious classes off campus,
the state merely acted to redress the balance, i.e.,
it restored to the students an opportunity to exercise the religious freedom which they enjoyed
before regular school attendance was required.
To a large extent, however, this same argument
was also involved in the school prayer cases where
a Zorach rationale was rejected by a majority of
eight members of the Court. The lone dissenting
opinion, by Mr. Justice Stewart, argued that the
compulsory
school
attendance
law initially
operated to make it more difficult for children to
engage in the free exercise of religion, i.e., that it
tended to abridge religious activities: "[A] compulsory state educational system so structures a
child's life that if religious exercises are held to be
an impermissible activity in schools, religion is
placed at an artificial and state-created disadvantage. Viewed in this light, permission of such
exercises for those who want them is necessary if
the schools are truly to be neutral in the matter of
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With the possible exception of Zorach, however, all of the establishment cases are seemingly consistent with the standard of neutrality
which we have derived from the Court's several
opinions. Even so, there is widespread disagreement within the Court and among the
commentators as to the constitutionality of a
vast number of existing and proposed churchreligion." School District v. Schempp, above,
note 1, at p. 313.
Nevertheless, more than "neutrality" was involved in the prayer cases. In the following respects, the program as it was administered did
more than merely restore the opportunity children
might have had to exercise religious prerogatives
in the absence of any compulsory school attendance: (a) The prayer in Engel was obviously not
of each student's or each family's private choosing, but was composed by state officials and was
sectarian in character; it read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us,
our parents, our teachers and our country." The
Court has defined religion broadly, to include
some nontheistic and many relatively small sects.
See text at n. 32, infra. In this view, the Engel
prayer becomes sectarian, e.g., the invocation of
God is incompatible with nontheistic sects, an
oral prayer is disliked by Quakers, the presumed
value of prayer itself, describing the relationship
between man and God as one of supplication and
paternal response, and the use of a prayer to favor
a particular country-all
of these are variously
offensive to a number of religions. (b) The prayer
and scriptures in Schemnpp and Murray, while obviously not composed by the state, were prescribed by the state and were equally sectarian.
(c) The excusal procedure, as noted by Mr.
Justice Brennan, School District v. Schempp,
supra, at pp. 288; itself tended to coerce students
at least more than were there no school environment. (d) Some tax funds contributed by people
opposed to the prayers were involved in the
salaries of the teachers and provision of the classrooms, at least more than were there no school
program, with each family being left to its own
resources: id. at p. 229-30 (where appears the separate opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas): "[T]he
present regimes must fall under that clause for
the additional reason that public funds, though
small in amount, are being used to promote a
religious exercise....
Such contributions
may
not be made by the State even in a minor degree
without violating the Establishment Clause. It is
not the amount of public funds expended; as this
case illustrates, it is the use to which public funds
are put that is controlling." (e) Conducting daily
religious exercises in a classroom and under the
direction of teachers provided an atmosphere in
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state relationships.26 With respect to financial
relationships, questions continue to arise concerning the tax exemptions accorded church
property, parochial schools, the income of
churches, and church supported and supporting
enterprises, as well as the tax deductibility of
to religious organizations."
contributions
which the students might well be more substantially influenced than would be the case if there
were no school system, and religious instruction
left to each family and church. On balance the
prayer cases appear to have been decided correctly.
Not all of the aggravating elements of the
prayer cases were present in Zorach, of course,
and thus the case may still be as valid as Mr.
Justice Brennan has recently suggested, id. at
p. 262: "The deeper difference was that the
McCollum program placed the religious instructor in the public school classroom in precisely
the position of authority held by the regular
teachers of secular subjects, while the Zorach
program did not."
Nevertheless, the arrangement even in Zorach
actually did more than restore opportunities for
religious endeavors which young people would
theoretically have had in the absence of compulsory school attendance laws, and for this reason, the case is of doubtful authority. If the purpose of the released time program was merely to
allow students to follow their own, or their
family's inclination to have them attend religious
classes during the week at some church, that
purpose would be adequately served by having
the school release all students at certain specified
times, leaving to each student and his parents the
decision as to how that released time should be
spent. In Zorach, however, those students not
attending religious classes were obliged to remain
in their regular classrooms, and careful records of
released students were maintained to make certain that they did attend the religious classes.
The net effect of the program was consequently to
ply a subtle coercion in favor of attendance at the
religious classes, and not merely to provide students with the same freedom of choice they would
have enjoyed had they all simply been dismissed
from school on their own, or their family's recognizance. See the several dissenting opinions in
Zorach v. Clauson, beginning at 343 U.S. 315.
26 See n. 5, supra; Pfeffer, "Some Current Issues in Church and State," Western Reserve Law
Review, Vol. 13 (1961), p. 9; Kauper, "Church and
State: Cooperative Separation," Michigan Law
Review, Vol. 60 (1961), p. 1; Kurland, Religion and
the Law (1962).
"Preferment of Religious In27 See Paulsen,
stitutions in Tax and Labor Legislation," Law
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Equally, the inclusion of parochial schools in a
program of federal aid for education has raised
questions,28 as has existing federal assistance to
church-operated hospitals,29 the salaries of
congressional and military chaplains, the cost
of military chapels, and the federal "hot lunch"
program which serves parochial as well as
public schools. With respect to the regulatory
disagreement
government,
of
authority
abounds as to the constitutionality of the conscientious-objector exemption to the draft law,
anti-contraceptive laws, Sunday closing laws,
religious holidays, and the fragments of religiosity in public life such as the use of the phrase
"under God" in the pledge of allegiance, and
"In God We Trust" in the national motto and
on all U.S. currency.30
These disagreements seem likely to continue,
at least until the Court clarifies several particular parts of the test. Certain hard questions
have by no means been finally resolved. Principal among the unsettled ambiguities of the
church-state standard of the First Amendment
are these:
and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 14 (1949), p.
144; Stimson, "The Exemption of Property From
Taxation in the United States," Minnesota Law
Review, Vol. 18 (1934), p. 411; Note, "Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion,"
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 49 (1949), p. 968;
Comment, "State Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause," Stanford Law Review, Vol. 9
(1957), p. 366. See also Arvo Van Alstyne, "Tax
Exemption of Church Property," Ohio State Law
Journal, Vol. 20 (1959), p. 461; Orinan, Religion,
the Courts, and Public Policy (1903), pp. 1-38.
"Wall of Sep28 Compare Butler and Scanlan,
Gloss on the First Amendaration-Judicial
ment," Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 37 (1962) p.
288 with Pfeffer, "Federal Funds for Parochial
Schools? No.," Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 37
(1962), p. 309; Konvitz, "Separation of Church
and State: The First Freedom," Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 14 (1949), p. 44.
29 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899),
sustaining such an arrangement. This case may
also be pertinent to discussions of federal aid for
education.
30 Compare
Kurland, Religion and the Law
(1962), pp. 40-41 with Conklin, "Conscientious
Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of
Torcaso v. Watkins," Georgia Law Journal, Vol.
51 (1963), p. 252. Compare the separate opinion
of Mr. Justice Douglas, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 437 (1962) with the dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Stewart at p. 444, and see the opinion
by Mr. Justice Brennan in School District v.
Schempp, supra, at pp. 296-304.
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1. By what means are secular interests of
government rationally distinguishable
from religious interests which government
may neither abridge nor establish?
2. Assuming there is a tenable distinction, to
what extent will the Court attempt to
determine which among several intertwined secular and religious objectives the
legislature was primarily attempting to
promote in fact?
3. Assuming that a particular item of secular
legislation also produces a significant
advantage or disadvantage to religion,
how feasible must alternative means of
accomplishing the secular objective without the same effect on religion be, before
the Court will hold that the availability of
those alternative means operates to invalidate the particular scheme elected by
a legislature?
4. In determining whether religion has been
burdened or benefited by a particular law,
to what extent will the Court review related laws to measure the net effect of the
broader governmental activity?
The remainder of this article will attempt to
illustrate these problems and explore some
suggestions which may be useful in their solution.
II
Separating Secular from Religious Objectives."
In Torcaso v. Watkins and School District v.
Schempp, the Court observed that "religion" is
not merely co-extensive with the systematic
theologies of the most prominent religious
organizations in American such as Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism. Rather, religion includes the beliefs of at least eightythree separate religious bodies with memberships in the United States exceeding 50,000,
including a number of nontheistic religions
such as Ethical Culture and Secular Humanism.32 The inclusion of these groups is, of
course, unsurprising; it is easily argued that
there are philosophic systems in the United
States with far fewer than 50,000 adherents
which are equally entitled to be recognized as
31 "[TIhe line which separates the secular from
the sectarian in American life is elusive." Mr.
Justice Brennan, in School District v. Schempp,
supra, at p. 231. For thoughtful consideration of
this problem, see Kauper, "Church and State:
Cooperative Separatism," Michigan Law Review,
Vol. 60 (1961), p. 1, 22; Kauper, "Separation of
View,"
Constitutional
Church and State-A
Catholic Lawyer, Vol. 9 (1963), pp. 32, 41.
32 367 U.S. at 495 n. 11; 374 U.S. at 214.
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"religions" for constitutional purposes.33 Nevertheless, even the limited breadth of the
Supreme Court's definition creates a grave
theoretical problem in the enforcement of the
First Amendment, because the scope of religious interest as thus defined frequently makes it
nearly impossible to distinguish between religious objectives which government is not
supposed to establish or abridge, and secular
objectives which it is free to accomplish by law.
The reserved powers of the states, for instance, are frequently declared to include the
power to promote the health, safety, morals
and general welfare of the people. In the exercise of these powers, a variety of states have
adopted anti-discrimination laws, anti-obseenity laws, anti-contraceptive laws, and Sunday
closing laws. While some of these laws may find
support among persons who claim they are not
at all religious, many more people support and
agitate for such legislation because they believe
such laws to be religiously desirable. Manifestly, to the extent that the states employ
their powers to enact and to enforce these laws,
they are necessarily tending to establish what
is partly a religiously supported and supportive
arrangement. That the arrangement may also
have non-religious utility, in the sense that it is
supported by some people not asserting a distinctly religious interest in the matter, does not
make the resulting law significantly less of an
establishment of religion in public life. A hardboiled theory of the Establishment Clause
might suggest that all such laws are unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, one is immediately repelled by
this suggestion, if only because it would necessarily invalidate the great majority of all
welfare legislation and virtually paralyze
government from performing useful services in
general. In fashioning a pragmatic response to
this issue, the Supreme Court has generally
defined "religion" in two different ways under
the First Amendment. For purposes of the
Establishment Clause, religion has pretty well
33 Julian Huxley, for instance, while disbelieving in a God, systematic theology, or even a general metaphysics, nevertheless describes his own
humanism as a
to evolutionary
commitment
religion. Huxley, Religion Without Revelation
(1957), pp. 20, 194. For equally broad definitions
by American philosphers and theologians, see
James, Essays in Pragmatism (Castell ed., 1952),
pp. 122-24; Dewey, Intelligence in the Modern
World (Ratner ed. 1939), p. 1036; Tillich, "The
University of Southern
Sum and Substance,"
California Alumni Review, Vol. 44 (1963), pp.
11, 13.
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been confined to the preachments of organized
groups-which groups may attempt to manipulate the civil process to establish their own,
distinct theology through the law or attempt to
wrest benefits from the civil process which are
of special concern to them and not shared by a
cross-section of persons outside their particular
church or band of churches. The laws requiring
the saying of prayers or the reading of scriptures in class, for instance, are a clear example
of distinct efforts at institutional religious
aggrandizement, not primarily serving any
needs or wants of others. More to the point, if
the Court were to find such practices compatible with the Establishment Clause, such a
finding would manifestly undercut the objective of the Amendment to withdraw incentives
from religious organizations to exert institutional pressures on the civil process.
Where the legislation in question is not in
fact the consequence of particular institutionalized religious pressure, however, its coincidental harmony with, and establishment of, religious values will not be regarded as offensive
to the Establishment Clause. The clearest
statement of this position is found in Mr.
Justice Warren's dictum in McGowan:
[Tihe "Establishment" Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason
or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some or all religions. In many
instances, the Congress or state legislatures conclude that the general welfare of society, wholly
apart from any religious considerations, demands
such regulation. Thus for temporal purposes,
murder is illegal. And the fact that this agrees
with the dictates of the Judaeo-Christian religions
while it may disagree with others does not invalidate the regulation. So too with the questions of
adultery and polygamy. Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333; Reynolds v. United States, supra. The
same could be said of theft, fraud, etc., because
those offenses were also proscribed in the Decalogue.34

Intellectually, the Chief Justice doubtless overstated the case in asserting that such legislation
is adopted "wholly apart from any religious
considerations," for some more or less privately
held religious consideration probably underlies
the value judgments held by the great majority
of electors and legislators who created the
law.35Especially was this so in the very Sunday
34McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 442.
35 See n. 42, supra, and Mr. Justice Frank-

furter, in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
461 (1961): "Religious beliefs pervade, and religious institutions have traditionally regulated,
virtually all human activity."
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Closing Law Cases in which this statement
appeared. Nevertheless, the practical effect of
the Chief Justice's proffered distinction is
probably the best compromise we can expect;
it guards against militant church pressures
while permitting laws which do not appear to
be the particular result of such institutional
pressure. This is not to assert, however, that
laws which have some hypothetical value beyond
serving the self-aggrandizing institutional interests of one or more churches are automatically valid under the Establishment Clause, as
the discussion in the following sections may
indicate. It is only to assert that there is a
clearer offense to the political objectives of the
Clause when a given law results from, or
tempts, institutional pressure from organized
religion and does not merely coincide with
matters of religious concern.
Religion may be a more inclusive thing, however, when the issue is whether freedom to
exercise religion has been abridged rather than
whether religion has been established. In this
connection, the Court's suggestion that "religion" is not merely co-extensive with the
better established and more highly organized
sects, may be taken more seriously. For while
the primary (although not exclusive) concern
of the Establishment Clause is to resist the
importunities of distinctly institutional religious pressures, the concern of the abridgment
clause is to protect individual prerogatives of
conscience,36 and not merely to protect the
freedom of institutionalized religion or conscience. Saluting the flag, for instance, may not
involve either marked assistance or harm to the
vast majority of people or to a church as such,
but the offense it gives to some who conscientiously oppose such a practice has been held
sufficient that the flag salute cannot be com-

pelled by law.37
Even so, at some point individual assertions
of conscience, absolutely sheltered by the
abridgment clause, could equally frustrate any
significant governmental activity just as a
broad definition of religion would bar other
36 School District v. Schempp, supra, at p. 22223: "The Free Exercise Clause . . . withdraws from
the legislative power, state and federal, the
exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of
religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty
in the individual by prohibiting any invasion
thereof by civil authority."
31 See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville School
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). As a
technical matter, however, the majority opinion
in Barnette was not based on an abridgment
theory.
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state action because it tended to establish
religion. In the face of religious objections to
medicine, for instance, laws requiring vaccination against contagious diseases, or fluoridated
water systems which all must use, constitute a
measure of abridgment. In these matters, the
Court may be expected to hold that where the
governmental activity is broadly supported by
democratically determined objectives which
are not anti-religious by design and which
cannot so feasibly be carried on without applying to all persons, an incidental abridgment of
some religious interests is constitutionally permissible.38 Where the public purpose can be
substantially served without discommoding
personal religious interests, however, the
abridgment clause may operate to shelter even
the unorthodoxies of small minorities or single,
unorganized individuals. Because the abridgment clause is more designed to protect the
individual as well as the church from the state,
while the establishment clause is more concerned with insulating the civil process from
manipulation by organized religion, we may
reasonably expect the Court to define "religion" more broadly in the context of alleged
abridgments.
Distinguishing Actual Purposes from Rationalized Purposes. Most of the laws reviewed by
the Court under the Establishment Clause,
and many still to be reviewed, produce a multiplicity of effects. Some of these effects are
clearly secular, according to common understanding, and others are clearly religious. In
Everson, as we have noted, one effect of the
reimbursement plan was to encourage safe
transportation and to reduce traffic hazards for
children, something clearly within the competence of government to accomplish. At the
same time, it was also true that another effect
was to subsidize religious instruction, by relieving parents of the cost of transporting their
children to parochial schools. In McGowan, as
we have noted, one effect was to promote the
general welfare by guaranteeing one day each
week free from common labor. At the same
time, the arrangement did throw the weight of
government behind those religions that seek
the observance of Sunday strictly for religious
reasons. To a lesser extent, the prayer cases
involved entwined secular and religious objectives; the use of prayers at the beginning of
each school day was defended before the Court
partly on the grounds that it served the follow'8 See, e.g., The Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366 (1918); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951). For a more questionable instance, see In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
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ing independent and salutary secular purposes:
to foster harmony and tolerance among the
pupils; to cause each individual pupil to constrain his overt acts and consequently to conform to accepted standards of behavior during
his attendance at school; to enhance the
authority of the teacher; and to inspire better
discipline.39 Similarly, the pledge of allegiance
arguably serves secular as well as religious
purposes, e.g., to inculcate a spirit of nationality, loyalty, and patriotism in the young, or
"merely to recognize the historical fact that
our Nation was believed to have been founded
'under God.' "40 Federal aid proposals, inclusive of parochial schools, may be defended as
promoting education to better the economy,
education and defense of the country, or
criticized as subsidizing the inculcation of religion in parochial schools.4'
Since the operation of these laws does produce multiple effects, it is obvious that the
constitutionality of a particular scheme may
well depend upon the judicial characterization
as to which of these is the predominant effect.42
If the Court describes the law to emphasize
only its secular objectives, suddenly the constitutional objection may virtually disappear. On
the other hand, if the question is phrased to
emphasize the effect on religion, the law in
question is made to appear unconstitutional on
its face. The selective use of legislative effects
is manifest in the differing characterizations of
the law in Everson. Mr. Justice Black viewed
the law as though the township council had
been solely concerned with the incidence of
traffic accidents among school children, and
had acted in response to a popular demand for
municipal protection:
[New Jersey'sI legislation, as applied, does no
more than provide a general program to help
parents get their children, regardless of their
religion, safely and expeditiously to and from
accredited schools.43
39 See the Schempp case, supra, at pp. 223,278-79.
40 Id. at 304. The argument is elaborated in

Choper, "Religion in the Public Schools," Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 47 (1963), pp. 329, 410.
41 See articles in n. 28, supra.
42 Kauper,
"Church and State: Cooperative
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 60
Separatism,"
(1961), pp. 1, 35: "It is apparent that the solution to some of these problems depends on placing the right label on the legislative program,
and that if we can label a particular program as
social or child welfare rather than aid to religious
education, we thereby determine the constitutional result."
43 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,
18 (1947).
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On the other hand, Mr. Justice Jackson described the township's reimbursement plan as
though it had been adopted solely as a result of
importunities by Catholics to obtain financial
assistance:
If we are to decide this case on the facts before us,
our question is simply this: Is it constitutional
to tax this complainant to pay the cost of carrying pupils to Church schools of one specified
denomination?44
Neither of these descriptions is wholly correct or incorrect. Both, however, may be somewhat disingenuous, and surely it cannot be
determined merely by studying the face of the
ordinance which effect was in fact the primary
one as intended by the council which adopted it. If
the constitutional requirement is that a law
affecting religion cannot stand unless it is supported by a primary and independent secular
objective, it would seem imperative in situations such as this for the Court to attempt to
discover which among several objectives actually provided the primary incentive for the law.
If in fact the ordinance in Everson was merely
the result of Catholic pressure for aid, for instance, the law would appear to be a product of
the very kind of church-state collaboration
which the First Amendment meant to discourage even if such collaboration is disguised
as a "safety" law.
It is sometimes exceedingly difficult for
courts to determine legislative purpose, especially in connection with state statutes enacted
by legislatures which do not maintain a journal
of debate or a record of committee hearings.
The difficulty of the task should not be exaggerated, however, and ought not be confused with
a judicial search of legislative motives. The
motives of legislators more commonly concern
their personal reasons for acting, e.g., sympathy or hostility to religion, desires to be reelected, etc., whereas their purpose in acting
more substantially relates to the immediate
objective to be accomplished by the law which
is enacted.45
It is to be hoped that the Court will not belittle the Establishment Clause by rationalizing
primary secular purposes from the face of laws
they are called on to review, and by neglecting
the essential inquiry into legislative facts. At
the same time this technique of judicial abdication is available, and occasionally has been
44Id. at 21.
46 For an excellent
discussion and reference to
supporting cases, see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270
F.2d 594, 609-611 (5th Cir. 1959) (dissenting
opinion), rev'd, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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used. In United States v. Kahriger,46 the Court
sustained a federal statute which purported to
be an exercise of the tax power applied to
wagering transactions. But the legislative history of the statute indicated that it was not
designed so much to raise revenue, a proper tax
purpose, as to suppress gambling and to assist
local governments in prosecuting gamblerspurposes clearly not among the delegated
powers of Congress. In dissent, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter took the legislative record into
account and made the following observation
which is equally relevant to the judicial review
of church-state cases:
[W]hen oblique use is made of the taxing power
as to matters which substantively are not within
the powers delegated to Congress, the Court cannot shut its eyes to what is obviously, because
designedly, an attempt to control conduct which
the Constitution left to the responsibility of the
States, merely because Congress wrapped the
legislation in the verbal cellophane of a revenue
measure.47

Similarly, in Barenblatt v. United States,48 the
Court upheld the contempt conviction of a congressional committee witness who refused to
answer questions which were logically relevant
to a subject matter within the committee's investigative competence. In dissent, however,
Mr. Justice Black carefully reviewed the record
of the committee and concluded that the
actual purpose in asking the questions was
merely to expose the witness to public obloquy.49 Since this was the primary purpose of
the questions, and such a purpose was not a
proper function for the government,50 he voted
345 U.S. 22 (1953).
Id. at 38.
48 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
49 Id. at 153-66.
For other cases in which the
Court has deferred to Congress and has been
satisfied with a mere rational nexus, see Howell,
"Legislative Motive and Legislative Purpose in
the Invalidation
of a Civil Rights Statute,"
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 47 (1961), p. 439.
60 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200
(1957): "There is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure." See also Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Gibson v.
Florida Legislative
Investigation
Committee,
372 U.S. 539, 545, 567 (1963); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
It is arguable, however, that while exposure is
not a valid congressional purpose when the object
of a legislative investigation is a private, volun46

47
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to reverse the conviction. In Justice Black's
view, it was not enough that the questions
could serve a proper governmental objective, if
in fact it (a) also served unconstitutional objectives and (b) the legislature's primary purpose
was to accomplish the latter. The same thing
can be said in reviewing legislation which accomplishes a multiplicity of secular and
religious objectives.
There is reason to anticipate that the Court
will make a more assiduous inquiry into legislative purpose in future cases, at least where state
laws are involved."1 In a number of the race
cases, state laws which ostensibly served
legitimate legislative objectives have been
struck down when it became clear that they
also served illegimate objectives which actually inspired the legislation.52 Similarly, in
the most recent school prayer cases, Mr. Justice Brennan acknowledged that such prayers
may have some secular effects wholly within
the power of the state to promote, but he found
that these, on closer examination, were not independent effects nor in fact the primary purtary association, it may become so when the
investigation is of a department of government.
Additionally, it remains true that some purpose
other than exposure nearly always can be rationalized, and the dictum in Watkins has not yet
become a holding if only for this reason: "The
truth of the matter is that the balancing test,
at least as applied to date, means that the Committee may engage in any inquiry a majority of
this Court happens to think could possibly be for
a legitimate purpose whether that 'purpose' be
the true reason for the inquiry or not. And under
the tests of legitimacy that are used in this area,
any first-year law school student worth his
salt could construct a rationalization to justify
almost any question put to any witness at any
time." Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399,
420-21 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
51 It has been ably argued that greater judicial
self-restraint is justified in reviewing federal,
rather than state, laws. Wechsler, "The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government," Columbia Law Review, Vol.
54 (1954), p. 543.
52 See, e.g., NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594, 606-11 (5th Cir. 1949)
(dissenting opinion), rev'd, 364 U.S. 339 (1960);
St. Helena Parish School Bd. v. Hall, 287 F.2d
376 (5th Cir. 1961).
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pose of the prayer.53 Even in the Sunday Closing Law Cases, the Court suggested that if the
legislative history of such laws disclosed a
primary religious inspiration for the enactment, rather than a general welfare purpose,
such a law would offend the Establishment
Clause:
We do not hold that Sunday legislation may not
be a violation of the "Establishment" Clause if it
can be demonstrated that its purpose-evidenced
either on the face of the legislation, in conjunction with its legislative history, or in its operative
effect-is to use the State's coercive power to aid
religion.54

It may be thought ironical that such an analysis
may hold one law constitutional and another
unconstitutional, when both operate in identical fashions in two different communities.
Nevertheless, if one of the purposes of the
Establishment Clause is to discourage attempts
by organized religion to manipulate the civil
process, certainly it is necessary and appropriate for the Court to determine whether such
attempts accounted for the laws being reviewed. Any other approach to the subject invites religious establishment in cellophane
packages, and would frequently make it
empirically impossible to determine whether
there was any primary secular objective being
served by the law.
Alternative Means of Fulfilling Governmental
Functions Without Pronounced Effects on Religion. To illustrate the importance of this consideration, it is useful to consider the controversy over aid to education. At the outset, it
is certainly clear that state governments fulfill
a proper role by encouraging education through
the enactment of attendance laws, the construction and operation of schools and universities, and by providing a host of auxiliary
services such as transportation, books, counselling offices, recreation facilities, etc., as well as
the basic paraphernalia of a school itself.
Similarly, it is also virtually beyond question
today that the federal government may assist
and encourage these undertakings as it has in
the historic grants of public lands, in providing
National Defense, Fulbright, National Institute of Health and other scholarships, in
providing research contracts which enable
universities to add to their facilities, staff, and
student bodies, etc. Virtually nothing in the
current debate concerning aid to education
53 School District v. Schempp, supra,
at p. 280.
See also the opinion for four members of the
Court, by Mr. Justice Clark, at 224.
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 453.
54McGowan

878

THE AMERICAN

POLITICAL

raises a constitutional question challenging the
power of Congress to assist education in general, although some may doubt its political
wisdom and many disagree as to how extensive,
or in what manner, such assistance might best
be provided.
Granted that federal assistance to education
would serve a proper governmental function,
it might appear that the inclusion of parochial
schools and colleges in such a program would
not raise any serious constitutional issue either.
For just as in Everson or the Sunday Closing
Law Cases, any benefit which religious institutions might derive from such a program
could be defended as merely incidental to a
primary and independent secular purpose, and
so long as the legislative record disclosed that
Congress's paramount interest was really to
foster education, rather than primarily to
promote religion, the arrangement would appear to be valid.
The Supreme Court has suggested, however,
that the requirement of church-state separation is not to be regarded so narrowly. It is not
enough that a proper purpose was sincerely intended to be fulfilled by government, if that
purpose could have been substantially fulfilled by
other means which involve less effect on religion.
The precept of the First Amendment is that
government should attempt to promote the
general welfare with the least effect on religion,
and not merely that it should promote that
welfare with but incidental, albeit substantial,
effect on religion. Thus, in McGowan v. Maryland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
If the value to society of achieving the object of a
particular regulation is demonstrably outweighed
by the impediment to which the regulation subjects those whose religious practices are curtailed
by it, or if the object sought by the regulation
could with equal effect be achieved by alternative
means which do not substantially impede those
religious practices, the regulation cannot be sustained.55

In the most recent school prayer cases, Mr.
Justice Brennan made a similar observation:
But the teaching of both Torcaso and the Sunday
Law Cases is that government may not employ
religious means to serve secular interests, however legitimate they may be, at least without the
clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will
not suffice.5"

The establishment issue in the proposals for
federal aid to education consequently cannot
66 Ibid. at p. 462.
56 374 U.S. 203 (1963) at 265. (Emphasis added)
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be resolved simply by asserting that "education" is the proper concern of government, and
that since parochial schools also meet the
secular standards of states or accrediting
associations, their inclusion would be constitutional. What the issue requires is a more
careful examination of: (a) the particular form
of aid which may be provided, to determine
whether its use is substantially confined to
secular purposes; and (b) the feasibility of
providing that aid through alternative means
which involve less of a subsidy to religious institutions. Note, for instance, how differently
the constitutional question might be answered
depending upon which of the following types of
federal aid proposals were adopted:
1. Congress appropriates one billion dollars
for "education", to be disbursed by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to each college which may receive a
total grant equivalent to $500 for each
full time student. The money thus disbursed may be used according to each
college's own determinations.
2. Congress appropriates one billion dollars
for "education," to be disbursed by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, upon the application of colleges
demonstrating a need and specific plans
for the construction of laboratories to be
used exclusively for teaching and research
in chemistry, physics, or engineering.
In the first case, a qualifying parochial college
would be free to employ the funds thus granted
to construct a chapel, to purchase additional
copies of the Bible, in the teaching or subsidizing of aspiring ministers and priests, etc. In
the second case, the funds are restricted so
that the benefits to religion are markedly reduced. Such benefits are still conspicuous,
however, in that the parochial college becomes
more attractive to applicants by enjoying an
enhanced physical plant, and private fundsfrom which the college otherwise derives its
support-may
now be released for wholly
religious uses on campus. While the first case
is almost clearly an instance of unconstitutional
aid in view of the dicta of the Court, the second
case appears arguable. A strict separatist
might well argue that because parochial
colleges account for only a small percentage of
higher education, it is feasible for government
to encourage education in the physical sciences
in a substantial fashion by limiting its aid to
public and nonparochial private colleges alone;
since this is a feasible alternative means of
carrying forward the primary secular objective
without the same benefit to religion, the
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Establishment Clause requires that this is the
way it must be done if it is to be done at all.
The difficulty is, however, that the Supreme
Court itself has not vigorously pressed the
alleged constitutional demand that government act to fulfill its proper functions with the
least advantage or disadvantage to religion,
and the issue of "alternative means" remains
very much of an open question.
In Braunfeld v. Brown,57 the Court upheld a
Sunday closing law even though the law made
no exception for businessmen whose religious
scruples obliged them to close on Saturday.
The law thus operated against Sabbatarians to
coerce them to offend their religious belief by
opening on Saturday, at the risk of losing two
days of business by closing both on Saturday
and Sunday. When the anti-religious effect of
the law was defended on the basis that it
nevertheless served a proper secular purpose of
setting one day aside for rest each week, the
plaintiff rejoined that this could be accomplished equally well, without affecting his
religion, by leaving the choice of the day to
close to each entrepreneur. As a matter of
fact, exceptions for Sabbatarians were already
provided for in the majority of the thirty-four
states having closing laws, and this was further
evidence of their feasibility. Nevertheless, the
Court rejected the sugestion and held that such
an alternative means of effectuating the welfare
policy of a closing law was not constitutionally
required by the abridgment clause of the First
Amendment.58
The closing cases also raised the same issue
under the Establishment Clause. It was
pointed out that the selection of Sunday as the
day to close was of greater benefit to the
Christian sects which predominated in the
state, than would be the selection of some
more neutral and less religious day, such as
360 U.S. 599 (1961).

In holding that an alternative day need not
constitutionally be provided for Sabbatarians,
Chief Justice Warren indicated that such an accommodation would not be a feasible alternative
because of: (1) added costs and administrative
difficulties in policing; (2) the business advantage
it might provide for those electing to close on a
different day and to open Sunday when competitors were closed; (3) the difficulty of determining the bona fides of those closing on a day other
than Sunday; (4) the inability of family members
and friends employed on Sunday to join with
others not employed on Sunday; and (5) the
general distraction from a day of uniform quiet
and rest which some commercial activity might
produce.
58
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Monday or Tuesday. If the purpose of closing
legislation was simply to assure a uniform day
of rest for all persons within the community,
this purpose could be equally accomplished,
with less benefit to religion, by choosing some
day other than Sunday. Even so, the Court did
not invalidate the Sunday closing law or require that the state pursue its objective by the
suggested alternative means. As a practical
matter, the Court appears to reserve a large
measure of discretion to the legislature, permitting it a good deal of latitude in selecting
among means which carry more or less benefit
or detriment to religion, while serving a primary
secular purpose.
Indeed, a rigorous application of the "alternative means" idea might well have produced a
different result in the Everson case, itself, the
first case forthrightly to consider the Establishment Clause. If the purpose of the township
was solely to promote safety in child transportation, and not also to assist parochial
schools, that purpose might well have been
served with less financial aid to the schools
simply by enacting an ordinance requiring
that school children be transported by regulated and licensed buses or automobiles. Since
the state obviously has the power, and has
often exercised it, to require that school buildings meet minimum safety standards without
reimbursing the schools for the cost of meeting
those standards, it could certainly proceed in
the same fashion in regard to transportation.
Yet, the availability of this alternative in
Everson was not enough to invalidate the reimbursement plan adopted by the township,
even though that plan obviously involved more
of a benefit to the parochial schools by providing a $40 a year reimbursement to parents.
We have already observed that Zorach v.
Clauson is also irreconcilable with a rigorous
"alternative means" test: if the purpose in
releasing children from school was merely to
give them an opportunity to attend religious
classes should they choose to do so, that purpose would have been adequately served
simply by releasing all students at certain
hours. It would not necessitate keeping nonparticipating students in school, keeping
records of those who were released to make
certain that they attended church classes, or
otherwise lending the public school apparatus
subtly to coerce young students to attend
religious classes.
With only eleven cases having been decided
under the Establishment Clause, and with
none dating farther back than 1947, it may
not be surprising that the Court has not pressed
an "alternative means" test. The fact that it

880

THE AMERICAN

POLITICAL

was employed in the school prayer cases, however, and that it is now more frequently observed in the dicta of the Court,59 may indicate that it would be more useful in the
future and that it is surely relevant to the
controversy concerning federal aid to education.
Measuring the Net Effect of Governmental
Activity on Religion. As cases have reached the
Supreme Court, the controversy as to whether
a given governmental activity unconstitutionally aided or harmed religious interests
has too often confined itself to limited facts.
Rarely have the litigants or the Justices examined the relation of those facts to other
facts which may have occurred earlier to affect
religious interests in one way or another. Yet,
when the totality of related governmental
transactions is considered, it may reasonably
lead us to assess the net effect on religious interests differently than were we to concentrate
only on one end of the transaction. This is
especially clear when the governmental activity involves taxes and expenditures, but it
may equally be so when the governmental activity involves a combination of regulations.
In Everson, for instance, the occasion for
litigation was the expenditure of public funds
in such a way as immediately to make it
cheaper and easier for students to attend
religious schools. By focusing only on the
expenditure of funds, all members of the Supreme Court agreed that religion was "aided,"
and thus the issue was made to turn only on
the question as to whether such aid was nonetheless constitutional because it was merely
incidental to a primary and independent
secular purpose which could not be equally fulfilled by means less beneficial to religion. The
funds expended by the township in Everson
necessarily came from some tax source, however, and the effect of the expenditure on religion cannot reasonably be determined in fact
unless the effect of the tax which makes the
expenditure possible is also considered.
If the expenditure came from an earmarked
fund, the whole of which was derived exclusively from property taxes imposed on all
real estate within the township, including the
realty of churches, church schools, and of church
members, it is clear enough that the raising of
that fund initially operated as a burden to
religion, i.e., it drained away some fiscal support
which the church schools might have had in the
absence of the tax. If the parents of parochial
school children are subsequently included in a
general reimbursement plan, the net effect of
'9

See text at nn. 55, 56 supra.
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the whole tax-and-spend transaction is substantially not one of "aid" to religion. Rather,
it is substantially to restore financial support
which was previously taken away by state
action. In one sense, the net effect may even
have placed religion at a slight disadvantage:
had there been no tax in the first place, the
additional money available to the church, freed
from such taxes, could have been spent for
exclusively religious purposes rather than for
transportation. As it is, given these assumed
facts, a court might well conclude that there
was no establishment of religion because
religion had received no substantial net advantage from the whole governmental transaction.
On the other hand, if the public fund from
which transportation reimbursement was made
came from property taxes which were not levied
on church property, nor the property of persons sending their children to parochial
schools, it would be much more clear that the
inclusion of parochial school parents in the
reimbursement plan did result in a substantial
net advantage for religion. As the Everson case
was actually decided by the Court, however, no
member of the Court raised any question as to
the source of the funds.
In reviewing proposals for federal aid to
education, an effort to consider the whole
transaction may also be helpful. The funds for
such aid must probably come from taxes the
great majority of which are imposed on personal and corporate income in the United
States. The Internal Revenue Code, however,
exempts the income of churches, church schools,
church supported and church supporting enterprises from the income tax.60 Moreover, it
also provides that contributions to religious
enterprises are tax deductible.6' Since the free
exercise of religion is not especially affected
adversely by income taxes, the inclusion of
church schools among the recipients of tax
funds would constitute governmental activity
resulting in a net benefit or advantage to those
schools. It is true, of course, that tuition payments to parochial schools are not currently
tax deductible, and to this extent the income
tax does operate to make it more expensive to
attend a parochial school than would be the
6? Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ?? 501 et seq.
See also ? 107.
61 Id. at ?170. For the estate tax advantages of
religious bequests, see ?642. For ways in which
the charitable gift can be used to maximum adsee Lowndes,
vantage,
"Tax Advantages
of
Charitable Gifts," Virginia Law Review Vol. 46
(1960), p. 394.
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case if there were no tax, or if a deduction
were allowed. On the other hand, the schools
receive real and substantial indirect benefits
from other governmental expenditures, simply
as members of the national community, e.g.,
the general protection theyreceivefrom national
defense. On balance, it would appear that tax
accommodations already made in behalf of
religion reinforce the argument that the inclusion of parochial schools in a federal education program would tend to establish religion,
in the sense of producing a clear net benefit. If
existing tax accommodations were removed,
however, such a program would be more constitutional in net effect.
There is also reason to consider the total
effect of governmental activity on religion, as
well as the net effect of clearly related transactions as in the tax-and-spend situations. The
gradual pervasion of American society by
government has caused a number of religious
organizations to fear that an unyielding
"neutrality" in the First Amendment must inevitably result in the gradual shrinking of
organized religion. In a very real sense, there is
cause for this alarm: not because the Establishment Clause itself expresses any hostility
toward religion, but simply because the
"neutralized" zone of governmental activity
continues to expand, gradually squeezing
religion from larger and larger areas of the
total environment.
From our previous discussion, it must surely
be clear that distinctly religious practices and
distinctly religious expenditures are forbidden
to government by the requirement of the
Establishment Clause. Distinctly religious
practices or expenditures by private citizens
and organizations, of course, are clearly not
affected by the Establishment Clause and are
theoretically protected by the abridgment
clause. As government services expand, however, and as more of the economy and environment is occupied by the increasing, public,
governmental sector of our society, the net
effect of the shift is to confine religion to the
ever shrinking domain of the relatively diminishing private sector. This does not mean that
the private sector has become smaller absolutely, of course, but that more rapid growth
in the public sector has resulted in a relative
displacement of some previously private activities. A hundred years ago, for instance, the
vast majority of colleges and universities were
private. Not being subject to the First or
Fourteenth Amendment, these colleges could
pervade their curricula with religious emphases, as indeed many denominational colleges did. Today, the majority of colleges and
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universities are state supported, subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment, and clearly not at
liberty to engage in or to promote religious
practices. We have witnessed a similar shift in
secondary education as well, and the shift
necessarily reduces the likelihood that the
students who today spend more of their time
within the public sector which is free of religious
influences, will themselves become religious.
What is true in education is equally true with
respect to certain other parts of the total environment. To finance expanding government
services, the combination of local, state and
federal taxes may gradually divert an increasing fraction of total personal income,
necessarily leaving proportionately less money
in the private sector to each person to spend
according to his individual choice, in support
of religion or other undertakings. To the extent
that the tax revenues thus collected may not be
spent by government to support religious
enterprises, but must be used exclusively for
secular purposes, the net effect, arguably, is to
reduce the relative supply of funds available to
religion.62

None of this, to be sure, warrants the judicial
junking of the establishment clause, or the
abandonment of its salutary political objectives. It may indicate, however, that the
First Amendment ought not be regarded as altogether religion-blind, i.e., absolutely forbidding government consciously to take religion into account. It surely makes reasonable,
for instance, an exemption from compulsory
attendance laws for children enrolled in
parochial schools, at least where these schools
62 On
the other hand, it is equally arguable that
government fiscal activity, far from reducing disposable personal income, actually increases it.
Funds taken in taxes are returned through the
spending power to private hands which may then
use the cash for religious or other purposes. And
because of the enhanced multiplier effect which
results from intelligent
public expenditures,
government fiscal policy obviously helps to generate more disposable personal income wholly
within the private sector of the economy itself.
Occasionally, in protecting the "free exercise of
religion," the Court has ignored the substantial
affirmative effects of governmental fiscal activity
and has concentrated unduly only on the immediate, negative, "proximate" effects. See, e.g.,
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 157 (1943);
Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). See also
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790
(1963).
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meet minimum standards of education.63 Similarly, it will justify Sabbatarian exceptions to
Sunday Closing Laws, even if such an exception may tend to provide the Sabbatarian with
a slight economic advantage in being free to
operate on a day during which some of his
competitors may be closed. It may also support, although it may not require, some tax
accommodations which currently exist in many
state and federal laws, even when the taxes
raised from others may be used in public
undertakings of indirect benefit to those who
did not contribute, e.g., to provide streets,
parks, police, and fire protection, and to generate more disposable personal income.64
3 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), not decided, however, on the basis of the
abridgment clause. See Kurland, Religion and the
Law (1962), pp. 27-28.
v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573
64 See Follett
(1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
319 U.S. 157
(1943); Douglas v. Jeannette,
(1943); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
See also Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46
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The neutrality of the First Amendment confronts difficult and unruly facts where it is
frequently impossible for government to act
without having some effect on religion, either
tending to abridge its free exercise or to establish it. Nevertheless, by carefully attending to
the net effect of government activity, by giving
attention to the real purpose of such activity
when it produces multiple effects, by remaining sensitive to alternative means available to
the civil process and obliging government to
select those which impinge upon religion least,
we may more nearly abide by the underlying
objectives of the First Amendment. While
nothing offered here automatically resolves all
issues where religious and state interests overlap or collide, the approach taken may at least
avoid the simplistic dogmatism which frequently accompanies more facile treatments of
the problem.
Cal. 2d 644, 298 F.2d 1, appeal dismissed, sub
nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921
(1956).

